Pakistan needs a truth and reconciliation commission
Pakistan-backed terrorists have killed more Americans than Iranian-sponsored groups. On foreign policy, too, Pakistan is a poor ally; it acts as a Chinese vassal and on important votes at the United Nations General Assembly it takes the American side only 18 per cent of the time-far less than even Somalia or Myanmar. As President Donald Trump reconsiders US foreign aid and cuts waste, fraud, and abuse across the U.S. government, Washington should question whether Islamabad deserves a single cent, let alone billions. Frankly, the broader international community should likewise reconsider any assistance to the Pakistani regime.
The irony is that almost everyone-Pakistanis and non-Pakistanis both-agree upon the reason for Pakistan’s dysfunction, democratic deficit, and radicalism: Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Early on in Pakistan’s history, the ISI became its own shadow government, shaping substantive internal and foreign policy more than did the elected government. The ISI’s malign influence within internal Pakistani politics increased after Bangladesh’s independence. Bangladesh sought to secede from Pakistan because of rampant discrimination by West Pakistan toward East Pakistan, but exposed Pakistan’s Achilles’ heel: While Pakistan identifies as an Islamic state, it is just a mosaic of different ethnic groups who happen to be majority Muslim. Often, these ethnic identities trump Islamic solidarity. In the aftermath of Pakistan’s loss of Bangladesh, the ISI decides it must propel radical Islamism as a glue to hold society together, or at least blunt ethnic identity so that Pakistani Punjabis could continue to dominate society.
This also translated into Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan feared the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as much as Saudi Arabia and the United States. After all, Pakistanis realised that if the Soviets consolidated control over Afghanistan, Pakistan could be next. That did not stop the ISI from seizing advantage of Pakistan’s position as a logistical hub. By transforming themselves into the logistical chokepoint for the Afghan resistance, the ISI ensured that only Islamists received weaponry and money. By transforming Afghanistan into an Islamic emirate, they hoped to blunt the threat of Pushtun nationalism that could threaten Pakistan’s North-Western Frontier Province.
The ISI’s supported extremists for another reason. Pakistan-like Turkey, Russia, and China-is unwilling to live within its borders and has expansionist designs. Legally, Pakistan has no claim to Kashmir and its occupation of nearly a third of the region is illegal. But sponsoring myriad terror groups, allows it to distract ordinary Pakistanis from asking why it is Pakistan teeters on the brink of state failure while India will soon become the world’s third largest economy.
It is questionable if the ISI-or Pakistan-can survive without foreign funds. Even Beijing is unhappy with Islamabad. Far from becoming the shining example of Belt-and-Road success, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has become a multibillion-dollar boondoggle.
Pakistan is not too big to fail but, if Pakistani authorities ever want to receiving international aid or rejoin the global economy in any meaningful way, international donors and lenders should make assistance contingent Pakistan establishing a truth and reconciliation commission to examine the ISI’s role in terrorism, its embezzlement, and its victimization of ordinary Pakistanis.
Truth and reconciliation committees are not new. Post-Apartheid South Africa’s case is most famous, but both Rwanda after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis and Morocco after the 1999 death of King Hassan II offer other examples. Perhaps the Nuremberg trial after World War II offers a further example, although that trial was more about justice than reconciliation. Collaborated testimony could lead to commutation of potential death sentences or reduction of other sentences.
There is also precedent within Pakistan: The Hamoodur Rahman Commission, for example, examined Pakistan’s political and military involvement in East-Pakistan from 1947 to 1971. While it identified neglect, abuse, and dereliction of duty among the Pakistan Army, it lacked the teeth to effectively assess the ISI.
A new Commission could examine and receive on-the-record testimony from senior ISI officials regarding ISI support for the Haqqani network, Laskar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Haqqani Network. It should explore both the 2008 Mumbai attacks training and efforts to protect the terror networks as well as the backroom deals leading to Pakistan’s removal from the Financial Action Task Force grey list.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission might also explore ISI involvement in politics. In September 1988, for example, ISI Chief Hamid Gul helped the opposition to undercut Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party. She ultimately became prime minister in December 1988, but only after agreeing both to continue General Zia-ul-Haq’s Afghanistan policy and to keep Gul and Army Chief of Staff Mirza Aslam Beg in their posts, and to maintain the defence budget.
There must also be an accounting for ISI interference in the judiciary. One year ago, six Islamabad High Court judges accused the ISI of judicial interference by threatening and conducting illegal surveillance of judges and coercing them by means of abducting and torturing their relatives.
The new Truth and Reconciliation Commission might also examine the historical record to shed light on systematic abuses of ethnic minorities. The ISI continues to obfuscate those most responsible for the 1971 Bangladesh Genocide. The Commission should also document how Pakistan transformed from a relatively tolerant country that included Hindu and Christian holidays as national holidays to a country that used blasphemy laws to incite mob violence and justify lynching of religious minorities. A Commission should also expose the ISI’s sorry history of encouraging Deobandi groups to target Ahmadis and Shi’a, Hindus, Sikhs and Barelvis. They might also explore whether ISI members profited from the targeting of Ahmadis and Shi’a by then acquiring their land and businesses at reduced prices.
For too long, the international community has approached Pakistan as if the country had a minor cold when, in reality, it had a malignancy that metastasized throughout every aspect of Pakistani society.
Pakistanis deserve better. To pour money into Pakistan today is to condemn Pakistanis to more bloodshed and misery. Only when Pakistanis understand the true depth of ISI malfeasance can Pakistan have any hope for peace and prosperity.
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
